This year has seen a step change in the intensity of attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector, creating risks that extend far beyond energy as Ukraine approaches the winter months. While Russia has regularly targeted energy infrastructure in Ukraine since its full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022, its most recent bombardments have been unprecedented in scale; a concerted attack in late August 2024, for example, involved more than 200 missiles and drones. Air defence measures have been unable to prevent major damage. The primary targets have been in the electricity sector – including generation, transmission and distribution – but district heating networks and some gas infrastructure have also been hit.

Rolling blackouts and other unscheduled interruptions to supply have become the norm, limiting electricity provision in the worst-affected regions to a few hours per day. While Ukrainians have showed immense solidarity, courage and ingenuity – and support from Ukraine’s international partners has been crucial in keeping systems functioning – the power system is increasingly fragile. During the summer of 2024, Ukraine experienced a major power deficit as generation capacity fell more than 2 gigawatts (GW) below peak demand of 12 GW. Unreliable electricity is having knock-on effects on all aspects of daily life. Strains that are bearable in the summer months may become unbearable when temperatures start to fall and supplies of heat and water falter, triggering further displacement of affected populations across the country and abroad.

Ukraine’s energy system made it through two successive winters since Russia’s invasion, but the third promises to be the sternest of tests. Over the course of 2022 and 2023, about half of Ukraine’s power generation capacity was either occupied by Russian forces, destroyed or damaged – and approximately half of large network substations were damaged by missiles and drones. Strains on Ukraine’s energy sector through the first two winters of war were mitigated by significant reductions in demand, relatively mild weather and a major collective effort to repair damaged facilities and mobilise alternative sources of supply. However, intensified attacks between March and May 2024 left Ukraine with only around a third of its pre-war electricity generation capacity by mid-year, even before the latest strikes. The stresses on the system are now immense. Ukraine is increasingly dependent on the three remaining operational nuclear power plants and the over-crowded links between these plants and the main cities closer to the front lines in the east.

Ukraine’s international partners have been providing much-needed equipment and aid throughout the war, but today’s acute situation demands further support. After years of dependence on Russia for its energy supply, Ukraine is now looking west not only for short-term fixes, but also for integration, infrastructure links and, ultimately, a better kind of energy future. This report proposes tangible and immediate actions that Ukraine and its partners can take to address its pressing energy security vulnerabilities and to bolster Ukraine’s longer-term resilience. The central focus is naturally on Ukraine, but a coordinated regional approach is essential to address implications for Moldova. Four issues stand out:

• Ukraine’s severe electricity deficit. Peak demand could increase to 18.5 GW this winter. Even with the return of nuclear units from maintenance over the summer, and the continued import of 1.7 GW of electricity from Ukraine’s European neighbours, the supply deficit could reach as much as 6 GW, equivalent to peak annual demand in Denmark. Further attacks on infrastructure, unforeseen equipment failures and missed maintenance cycles add further risks.
• Heat supply to Ukraine’s major cities. Most attacks on heating infrastructure have occurred in regions close to the front lines. The Kharkiv region is now without large-scale heat generating capacity and other frontline regions – particularly Chernihiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy and Mykolaiv – have suffered severe damage to their heat generation capacities. Heat supply is also at risk in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv.
• Potential strains on Ukraine’s natural gas balance. Under average weather conditions, Ukraine could meet all its gas demand requirements from domestic production and storage, but a colder-than-average winter would increase the need for imports. Once Russian transit volumes halt in January, after current contracts expire, additional supply would require physical west-to-east gas flows piped to Ukraine from Central and Eastern Europe.
• Disruption to gas and electricity supply arrangements in Moldova. Moldova no longer relies directly on Russian gas to meet demand on the territory that it controls, but indirect dependence is still strong because it receives around two-thirds of its electricity from a large power plant based in the breakaway, Russian-backed region of Transnistria. The upcoming expiry of the transit arrangements for Russian gas through Ukraine, at the end of 2024, creates significant uncertainty for gas deliveries to the region of Transnistria and for Moldova’s electricity security.