Policy responses to date have focused on addressing the longer-term adequacy dimensions of the power system reliability and resilience challenge. However, relatively little attention has been given to addressing the more immediate power system security challenges facing the Kyrgyz power system.

Opportunities exist to implement a range of policies that could help to strengthen power system security in the shorter term, especially during periods of water shortage when power system reliability and resilience is likely to be under greatest stress. A comprehensive and integrated policy approach will be needed to help address this challenge in a timely, efficient and cost-effective manner. The following section outlines a way forward, built on a clear strategic policy goal and a set of mutually reinforcing policy measures that could be deployed to help strengthen power system security in Kyrgyzstan now and over the next decade. 

All effective policy roadmaps are built on clear strategic goals that provide the foundation for directing and driving the development and implementation of related policy measures. Strategic goals need to be simple statements of high-level policy intent. They also need to be realistic and feasible to implement, reflecting the practical circumstances governing policy development and implementation in relation to power system security.

The nature and scope of the reliability challenges facing the Kyrgyz power sector combined with the practical imperative to quickly improve the operational reliability and resilience of the power system during periods of water scarcity suggest the following key strategic goal for the roadmap.

The proposed goal focuses on strengthening the operational reliability and resilience of the Kyrgyz power sector in the short term. It focuses on a practical issue of particular relevance given the energy-constrained nature of the Kyrgyz power system, which brings substantial risk of power generation volatility and shortages during periods of water scarcity.

By focusing on strengthening power system security, the proposed goal also helps to address a potential gap in current policy-related activities to improve power sector reliability and resilience. At the same time, given the interrelated nature of power system security and adequacy, increasing the focus on power system security could also help to complement and strengthen the outcomes achieved through other activities aiming to improve the adequacy of electricity security. In these ways, the strategic goal provides a foundation for pursuing power system security that is consistent with Kyrgyzstan’s wider electricity security and related socio‑economic policy priorities. Overall, the proposed strategic goal has the potential to help accelerate roadmap development, simplify its implementation and maximise its effectiveness.

An effective policy roadmap will incorporate a mutually reinforcing set of policy measures to help achieve its goals. International experience suggests that the most effective approaches to improving power system security are built on an integrated set of proven and effective policy measures covering key issues including overarching system operation and management, supply-side initiatives, and demand-side initiatives.

Proposed measures should also reflect any practical constraints governing the wider operation and development of the power sector in Kyrgyzstan potentially including financial, technical, commercial, managerial and socio‑economic dimensions. Ultimately, the roadmap will incorporate a limited number of key policy measures that offer the greatest potential to strengthen power system security consistent with achieving the roadmap goal.

International experience shows that the nature and effectiveness of system operation is a key determinant of power system security outcomes in practice. In Kyrgyzstan, the technical standards and operational protocols governing system operation and the management of power system security have changed little since independence, with technical aspects relating to regional power exchanges governed by the 1998 Parallel Operational Agreement between national system operators and the CAPS regional dispatch centre.1

Technical standards have been augmented by various policies enabling the government to intervene to manage power production and consumption in the event of an emergency or natural disaster, or when the physical safety or security of people, installations or system integrity is threatened. Under Kyrgyzstan’s Electricity Law, interventions of this kind are to be implemented in a manner that minimises their impact on power sector operations and on power consumers. These provisions are complemented by the Rules for Use of Electrical Energy, which creates categories of reliability for power consumers. Those receiving the highest level of service reliability are eligible for uninterruptable power supply supported by separate, onsite backup generation.2

However, in practice, fundamental limitations of the power sector infrastructure have the potential to expose all electricity consumers to the risk of frequent service disruption. This is especially the case when the power system is under greatest stress during the winter peak season. A recent study noted that the system operator commonly runs key transmission network components well above their operational power flow ratings for sustained periods during winter to meet peak demand requirements.3 Such practices suggest that the power system is often not operating in accordance with generally accepted power system security standards during periods when the power system is at greatest risk of experiencing a major power system security event. In the absence of major and rapid infrastructure development, which is highly unlikely given current financial constraints, international experience highlights several initiatives that could be pursued in the short to medium term to strengthen power system management and operation, to help strengthen power system security.

In particular, there may be opportunities to more clearly define the system operator’s role and responsibilities, especially regarding the nature and scope of its authority to intervene to manage sustained power system security events. Opportunities to improve operating practices, with greater emphasis on system-wide preparation, and co‑ordination to support flexible, integrated real-time system management could also be explored. Effective real-time system operation also requires accurate and timely information and state-of-the-art technology to facilitate effective contingency planning, system monitoring, power flow management and co‑ordinated emergency response. These issues are explored further below. 

Operating practices

System operating practices are key determinants of power system security in practice. They translate the incentives created by the regulatory regime and security standards into protocols and practices that provide the means for delivering power system security.

Fundamental changes in power system capability and use, especially those resulting from the combination of deteriorating infrastructure and rapidly growing demand for power during the winter peak heating season, need to be appropriately reflected in operating practices if effective power system security is to be maintained. Protocols and practices governing contingency planning, real-time system operations and emergency management need to be updated on a regular basis to reflect these changing patterns of use and their evolving implications for maintaining power system security. Ideally, these activities should be undertaken from a whole-of-system perspective, potentially including more effective integration of transmission and distribution contingency planning, operations and emergency procedures where required. This may also include the operations of other key stakeholders whose actions can affect power system security, such as major generators and large loads.

System operating practices need to be flexible and adaptable to permit effective real-time management of power system security. International experience suggests that successful management of power system security is increasingly dependent on being able to effectively monitor, diagnose and respond to changing power system conditions in real time and over the course of a sustained emergency event.

To maintain effective situational awareness,4 system operators and responsible parties need to have access to accurate information that provides sufficient coverage of the power system to support effective monitoring and analysis of power system conditions in real time and over time. In Kyrgyzstan, this should include current and accurate information regarding the operational performance of key generators and network components, including information on water storage and flows which are critical for hydropower generation. In regional power systems spanning multiple control areas, such as CAPS, this should include ongoing real-time access to power flow data from across the integrated power system.

System operators or other parties responsible for managing power system security also need to be able to process this information quickly and effectively, to provide sufficient understanding to inform and adapt system operator interventions in real time and over time to manage power system security events. The capability, coverage and adaptability of energy management systems and other analytical tools used for contingency planning, power system monitoring and control, fault diagnosis, and emergency response will have a critical bearing on the effectiveness of power system security management in practice. Analytical tools and processes need to appropriately account for the potential influence of variability on power system security in this context. This is especially important in hydro-dependent power systems where periodic water shortages can significantly reduce power production capability for sustained periods.

Processes to review and develop system security standards and procedures should be undertaken on a regular basis to ensure their ongoing effectiveness. In particular, reviews should incorporate “stress testing” of procedures to ensure they can be deployed in a timely and effective manner in response to credible contingencies, especially contingencies associated with managing the impact of sustained water shortages on hydroelectric production during peak winter seasons. International experience suggests that active participation of all relevant stakeholders would help strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of a regular review and development programme.

Operating reserves and tools

System operators need to have access to sufficient contingency reserves and operating tools to be able to maintain power system security under a range of credible potential N‑1 events. The nature and volume of reserves required will depend greatly on the topology of the power system, related power flows and the range of credible N‑1 contingencies that need to be addressed.

For instance, a power system with limited network flow paths and capacity may contain a range of critical infrastructure points that will need to be appropriately managed from an N-1 perspective. Typically this may result in a higher proportion of total power system resources being deployed for system security purposes compared with more highly meshed and interconnected power systems. A larger proportion of power system resources may also be needed to ensure power system security in small or relatively isolated power systems, especially where maintaining power system security is dependent on the performance of one or two large generation or network elements. Similarly, hydro-dependent power systems that are exposed to periodic water scarcity may need a relatively large and diverse contingency reserve to manage exposure to the risk of periodic hydropower shortages.

Consideration should also be given to the nature of contingency reserves available for deployment and the extent to which they will enable system operators to effectively manage the range of credible threats to power system security. In Kyrgyzstan, high dependence on hydroelectric generation exposes the power system to periods of water scarcity which have the potential to seriously jeopardise power production during the peak winter season. This is a critical credible threat to power system reliability and resilience that an effective contingency reserve would need to be able to address.

International experience suggests that the most effective response in these circumstances would be to develop a contingency reserve based largely on thermal generation. Thermal generation provides a dispatchable source of power which is largely unaffected by water shortages. It can be strategically located adjacent to the main load centres, reducing the risk of network congestion unduly constraining power supplies. Also, it can be deployed as needed to offset any incremental loss of hydro production during periods of water scarcity. As a result, thermal generation possesses the technological and fuel diversity and the operational flexibility required to improve the reliability and resilience of a hydro-dependent power system during a period of water scarcity. Reserve capacity could be sourced from local thermal generators, or potentially from regional power suppliers where reserve-sharing arrangements can be relied upon to deliver on demand.   

In addition, a growing range of smart grid technologies have the potential to greatly enhance power system security. In particular, these technologies have considerable potential to improve the accuracy, quality and timeliness of information and support the development of more accurate and dynamic system modelling to help strengthen contingency preparation and real-time system operator situational awareness. They can also greatly increase system operator control over power flows, providing scope to significantly reduce power system losses, while permitting more flexible operation of power systems and more effective real-time responses to manage emergency situations. Furthermore, they offer the potential to facilitate real-time co‑ordination and more holistic management of system security in regional power systems spanning multiple control areas. Consideration could be given to further deployment of these technologies to help strengthen management of power system security, building on the initial projects undertaken with international partners.

Consideration could also be given to the nature and frequency of processes to review and test the effectiveness of emergency response resources. This could include “stress tests” of contingency reserve deployment, resilience and potential effectiveness in response to credible water scarcity scenarios.

Co‑ordination and communication

In practice, responsibility for delivering power system security is shared among all parties with the capacity to affect the reliability and resilience of power supplies, potentially including system operators, generators, network owners, large loads and regulators. Only when each of these parties is undertaking its role in a co‑ordinated manner can power system security be assured. Effective co‑ordination is achieved when all responsible parties work together in a way that maximises efforts to improve power system security in real time and over the course of a sustained power system security event.

International experience suggests some key preconditions for achieving effective co‑ordination of power system security. Roles and responsibilities for power system security need to be clearly defined, with individual and shared responsibilities identified, and potentially codified. The most effective arrangements typically seek to align accountabilities with role and function, so that the party best able to manage a power system security activity at least cost has the authority, means and incentive to act and can be held accountable for their actions. Codification of responsibilities, through legislation or regulation, can ensure that each party has clarity around its role and sufficient authority to undertake its responsibilities. It can also provide a strong incentive for effective co‑ordination and information exchange within a national control area and across a regional power system spanning multiple control areas.5

Co‑ordination during normal operating periods is usually supported by various institutional arrangements and processes to support ongoing engagement and information exchange between system operators and other responsible parties. Co‑ordination is typically more actively managed during sustained power system security events, such as those resulting from periods of water scarcity in hydro-dependent power systems. During these events, ongoing arrangements are often enhanced through the deployment of emergency management teams that operate for the duration of the event.

Similarly, co‑ordination that facilitates more integrated real-time operation and emergency responses across the CAPS region has the potential to greatly improve contingency preparation and management of power system security events. Several regional power systems have developed multilateral frameworks and agreements incorporating protocols to facilitate more effective co‑ordination of system operation before and during such events.6 Opportunities may exist to build on and expand existing bilateral and multilateral approaches, including joint preparation of contingency plans among system operators within CAPS, with agreed protocols for co‑ordinated action in the event of a major, sustained power system security event.

Effective co‑ordination also requires good communication and information exchange, which provides an essential foundation for improving system operator situational awareness and maintaining effectively co‑ordinated actions during sustained power system security events. Good communication among responsible parties needs to be based on accurate, timely and complete information exchange to support more effective operational contingency planning and power system security management. Consideration could be given to developing more comprehensive data and more effective data gathering capability, based on a clearly defined set of data requirements.

Similarly, the wider community will expect to be kept informed about events that affect the reliability of electricity services, especially during sustained emergency events. Experience suggests that communication strategies for engaging with the community need to be developed in advance and tested on a regular basis to ensure that they can be implemented quickly and effectively for the duration of a power system security event.

Training and capacity building

International experience highlights the importance of having highly trained and experienced system operators capable of quickly diagnosing and responding to power system security events. It also suggests that scope may exist to strengthen operators’ capacity to identify and respond to alert conditions and actual events through appropriate training and certification.

System operator training programmes in Europe and North America are increasingly emphasising emergency management and co‑ordination. Training programmes typically employ case studies and computer simulations based on actual power system security events or realistic credible contingencies. Most system operators are required to undertake at least five days of training each year. Consideration could be given to improving training programmes including by incorporating scenarios based on actual power system security events, wider use of simulators and emergency response exercises in training programmes, and developing joint training programmes to facilitate more effective co‑ordination among system operators within the CAPS region.

Skill development could be complemented and reinforced through the adoption of a common certification process and competency standards for all system operators. Consideration could also be given to linking system operator certification to an ongoing process of continual education and assessment.

Advance planning and preparation for sustained emergency events

Leading practice hydro-dependent power systems typically have emergency management plans prepared in advance to support timely and effective deployment of supply and demand measures during sustained periods of water shortage.7

These plans generally incorporate clearly defined objectives, minimum dedicated reserve requirements and metrics for activation and cessation of emergency interventions based on key triggers determined in advance, such as changes in water flow and storage levels, and changes in supply-demand balances.

Clear and objective triggers for activation and cessation of emergency interventions will help to build certainty, predictability and confidence in the response regime. Triggers should be built on changes in supply-demand balances, or some other combination or underlying fundamentals. For example, New Zealand has developed a leading-practice system of triggers linking the probability of power shortages to changes in water flow and storage levels, with the results published as a simple and robust forward indicator showing the likelihood of emergency intervention in the following two months.8 Objectivity can be further enhanced where the responsibility for declaring an intervention resides with an independent authority or is undertaken on the advice of an independent authority subject to clearly defined and predetermined activation criteria.

Plans should also address the roles and functions of the key stakeholders responsible for implementing the response to the extent required, including establishing overarching management responsibilities and arrangements, and mechanisms for co‑ordination and co‑operation among key stakeholders.

International experience also suggests that plans should incorporate proportional responses that are calibrated in relation to the expected nature, impact and evolution of each event. This will help reduce the risk of intervention delivering unintended outcomes such as unduly prolonging restrictions, or increasing related administrative or economic costs.

Plans also need to be regularly tested to ensure they have the desired effect and can be implemented in a timely and effective manner. Resourcing, co‑ordination and communication issues should be tested in this context. In particular, preparations and testing should ensure that all stakeholders with an implementation role understand their function, are appropriately resourced, and are prepared to undertake it in a co‑ordinated manner to deliver an effective response. Preparedness exercises should be conducted on a regular basis to ensure that measures can be implemented smoothly and effectively at short notice and under emergency conditions.

Supply-side measures are the primary means for managing power system security events, especially when those events are sustained over a longer period. Kyrgyzstan’s approach to managing power system security events to date has typically relied heavily on supply-side interventions. For instance, Kyrgyzstan responded to a forecast hydropower production deficit of around 3 000 GWh for the 2021‑2022 winter peak season with a range of supply-side measures. These measures included negotiating agreements to import: up to 900 GWh from the Republic of Kazakhstan; up to 750 GWh from the Republic of Uzbekistan; and up to 500 GWh from the Republic of Turkmenistan. In addition, generation from the Bishkek CHP facility increased by 2 000 GWh over the 2021‑2022 winter period.9

International experience suggests that maintaining power system security in hydro-dependent power systems may require access to a range of supply-side resources beyond the usual contingency reserves set aside for normal operations. In hydro-dependent power systems it is common practice to establish dedicated contingency reserves designed to offset supply-demand imbalances resulting from water scarcity. For example, the Swedish transmission system operator (TSO) procures a strategic reserve each year to cover the winter peak heating season. The volume of the reserve is determined on the basis of winter power balance forecasts conducted annually in advance, covering a range of scenarios ranging from normal operating conditions up to a one-in-ten-year cold winter. The section below provides further details.

In principle, contingency reserves should be sufficient to compensate for the loss of the largest power system generation or network element. In Kyrgyzstan, this would mean having sufficient reserves to make up for the loss of one of the Toktogul hydropower plant’s four 300 MW generators, which are the largest generating units in the Naryn hydropower cascade, and the main 500 kV transmission line connecting production in the south with major consumption centres in the north of the country.

However, from a power system security perspective, the key risk to be managed in the Kyrgyz context would be a sustained emergency event caused by a severe water shortage that restricts hydropower production. In this case, the likely magnitude of an emergency supply deficit in the Kyrgyz power system will depend greatly on the severity and duration of the water shortage event. Time of year will also have an impact given that the majority of power consumption occurs during the winter months, coinciding with the greatest likelihood of water shortages affecting hydropower production.

Previous periods of acute water shortage suggest that the likely magnitude of hydropower loss during this kind of event may be well above the levels implied by a strict application of the N-1 standard. For example, in the water shortage event during 2015 and 2016, the average level of hydroelectric production fell by around 1 800 GWh per year compared with the ten-year average. This represented an annual deficit of around 13.6%. However, the impact was felt largely during the winter heating season when the water shortage was greatest and demand was at its annual peak. Using seasonal power consumption patterns in 2019 as a guide,10 it is likely that that between 60% and 70% of the annual hydropower loss was realised during the winter heating seasons of 2015 and 2016. This implies that the magnitude of the supply response required at that time would have been between 1 050 GWh and 1 250 GWh for each winter heating season for the duration of this event. In annualised terms, this would have translated into a hydropower deficit during the winter period of between 16.4% and 19.1%.

Analysis of Naryn river water flows suggests that there’s roughly a 50% chance of water inflows being sufficient to meet hydropower requirements in a normal operating year, with significant production shortages likely during a 1-in-20 dry year event.11 The table below provides a simple sensitivity analysis of the potential implications for hydropower production and contingency reserve requirements associated with a range of possible water shortage events during the winter heating season.

Recent experience suggests that one-in-ten-year water shortages can translate into a reduction in hydroelectric production of between 20% and 40% during the winter peak heating season. Based on the sensitivity analysis presented in the table below, this suggests that an effective contingency reserve would need to be able to cover the loss of between 1 700 GWh and 3 400 GWh of hydro production in any given winter period, which translates into a minimum contingency reserve of around 780 MW.

International experience suggests that a wide range of supply-side measures could be included as part of a national contingency reserve. Some common examples are identified in the table below.

Domestic supply-side responses could be complemented with supplies imported from regional power producers. In principle, integrated regional power systems have the potential to strengthen power system reliability at least cost, through more effective sharing of reserve capacity, allowing system operators to draw on the reserves and resources of adjacent control areas to ensure reliable and secure system operation. In particular, it can improve management of frequency control and provide access to additional generating capacity to help stabilise the supply-demand balance during sustained emergency events.

The potential benefits for power system security are enhanced where greater integration allows for more effective deployment of complementary generation technologies. For instance, greater integration of hydro-based power systems with thermal-based power systems can strengthen security of supply in the hydro-based system during a drought. At the same time, greater integration of a hydro-based system with a thermal-based system can improve the operational resilience and flexibility of the thermal system, enabling more timely and effective responses to manage real-time changes in load. The reliability benefits of such integration were clearly demonstrated during the 2002‑2003 winter in the largely hydro-based Nordic regional power system, which was able to maintain uninterrupted power supplies despite experiencing a 1-in-200 year drought.12

As previously noted, CAPS was originally designed for this purpose, among other things. However, decades of regional power system fragmentation has greatly eroded the effectiveness of these arrangements. As a result, at present Kyrgyzstan has ad hoc access to limited regional reserve sharing. Opportunities exist to build on this foundation through more formalised arrangements that involve greater integration of contingency preparation and operational management of power system security across CAPS.

For instance, one leading practice example is the Nordic Regional Security Coordinator (RSC). Nordic TSOs have recognised the benefits of greater regional co‑operation and have developed the RSC to facilitate more efficient, timely and cost-effective management of power system security across the Nordic region. The section below provides further details.

Choices in relation to the combination of supply-side responses to develop and deploy will depend on a range of factors including: the nature and expected duration of power system security events; the relative cost and availability of supply-side options; the capacity to develop and effectively deploy those options; and the anticipated time frame for their deployment. Given these considerations, and given the hydro-dependent nature of the Kyrgyz power system, it is likely that the most feasible and effective approach would rely on a combination of supply-side measures based on local thermal generation.

One option would be to build a dedicated thermal generation plant with sufficient capacity to offset any potential reduction in hydropower production during periods of water scarcity. Such responses have been implemented in other hydro-dependent power systems around the world. Although appealing, such an option is unlikely to provide a timely or cost-effective response to the immediate power system security threat in Kyrgyzstan. A more cost-effective and feasible supply-side response may be to develop a contingency reserve drawing from existing assets.   

For example, the Bishkek thermal CHP plant possesses considerable underutilised generating capacity; provides technological and fuel diversity, improving overall power system resilience; and is located close to major electricity loads, helping to reduce exposure to network-related delivery risks. Accordingly, it has the potential to provide much of the electricity needed to offset any hydroelectric production losses during a winter water shortage. Consideration could be given to reserving a portion of its generating capacity for the capacity reserve on an ongoing basis, especially in the short term while other options are being developed.

However, for Bishkek co‑generation to provide an effective capacity reserve, it would need to be well maintained and have sufficient ongoing fuel reserves to ensure that it could be deployed to produce electricity at short notice with a high degree of reliability throughout the year, and especially during the winter peak season. Meeting this expectation in practice on an ongoing basis could prove expensive and problematic.

Ultimately, combining this measure with a range of other complementary and reinforcing supply-side measures could help to reduce the overall cost of maintaining an effective contingency reserve. It could also improve the reliability and resilience of the supply-side response by spreading the operational delivery risks across several different measures. Given Kyrgyzstan’s circumstances and based on the menu of options identified in the table below, potential complementary measures may include:

• Securing contingency reserves through permanent regional reserve-sharing agreements, calibrated on an annual basis to reflect projected changes in water resources.
• Sourcing surge capacity through contracting with domestic distributed generation and suppliers of mobile generation.
• Undertaking a range of targeted smart grid investments to reduce losses and improve the operational flexibility and resilience of power system operation, enabling the system operator to maximise output when supply-demand balances are under stress during periods of water shortage.

Many of the other supply-side options identified in the table below merit further examination. However, they are unlikely to be very effective or readily deployable in Kyrgyzstan in a timely or cost-effective manner in the short term.

Practical challenges associated with funding and immediately establishing a dedicated ongoing contingency reserve of the magnitude implied in the earlier sensitivity analysis of hydro production requirements could be greatly reduced by adopting a phased implementation strategy. For example, implementation could be divided into three stages, with the first stage proceeding immediately based largely on requisitioning capacity from Bishkek CHP. Subsequent stages could proceed in sequence at three-year intervals.

An approach of this kind would help to make the reserve more affordable by spreading the implementation cost across a much longer period of up to ten years, while greatly reducing the potential logistical challenges and risks associated with a more accelerated implementation plan. It would also facilitate the inclusion of potentially cost-effective supply-side options that may take longer to materialise, such as permanent regional reserve-sharing agreements, contracting with domestic distributed generators or incorporating capacity associated with a proposed second Bishkek CHP plant.13 In addition, it would allow time to develop a more diversified portfolio of supply-side options, which would help to increase the operational flexibility and resilience of reserve.

Traditionally, demand-side management in the power sector has relied on a range of regulatory measures and interventions, such as rotating load shedding, which are generally deployed in the short term to help manage power system security events. Utilities typically deploy demand-side measures to complement and reinforce supply-side measures in these circumstances. Demand-side measures have also been deployed in to help manage daily, weekly and seasonal periods of peak consumption that create tight supply-demand conditions that could threaten power system security. In Kyrgyzstan to date, regulatory demand‑side measures have usually been deployed as a mandatory emergency intervention of last resort when power system security is under threat and all available supply-side reserves have been fully committed.

International experience shows that measures to reduce demand can be deployed quickly, deliver substantial immediate savings14 and are among the most flexible resources available to help address power system imbalances, especially in hydro-dependent power systems during periods of water scarcity. Even relatively small volumes of demand restraint can substantially increase power system flexibility, reliability and resilience during these events.

Demand-side measures can provide a more flexible and efficient alternative to mandatory load shedding during emergency situations. Also, greater demand flexibility may reduce the volume of operating reserves required to deliver power system security, significantly reducing the cost of providing these services. Demand response can be fully activated over a very short time frame, making it an ideal alternative source of operating reserve, which can help to deepen and diversify the pool of reserves, improving overall contingency reserve flexibility and resilience. This could have the effect of improving overall power system security, while also having the potential to defer the need for incremental reliability‐based infrastructure investments.

The reliability, flexibility and resilience benefits for power systems from implementing effective demand-side measures were shown in the aftermath of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, where the resulting electricity savings enabled eastern Japan to avoid power cuts throughout the summer peak period. The main demand-side measures deployed are identified in the section below.

However, the potential for demand-side measures to help strengthen power system reliability and security remains largely untapped in most power systems, including in Kyrgyzstan.

Several potential demand-side measures could be considered to complement and reinforce supply-side measures in this context including various forms of rationing, measures to encourage behavioural change, rapid deployment of some energy efficiency practices and technologies, and substituting electricity consumption. 

Rationing

Mandatory rationing of power consumption provides the most direct and immediate means of moderating demand during an emergency event.

Rotating load shedding is the most common form of power consumption rationing applied by system operators during emergencies. It is relatively simple to implement using existing power system management infrastructure and can be done in a technically efficient and timely manner that directly responds to power system security requirements in real time. However, from a consumers’ perspective, it is often done with limited knowledge and warning, and in ways that may not reflect wider socio‑economic or community priorities or interests. As a result, this form of power rationing can be economically inefficient and rapidly become unpopular, placing substantial limitations on its use during sustained power system security events.

Leading-practice jurisdictions have sought to address these issues by transparently developing load-shedding protocols that seek to minimise their unintended socio‑economic impacts to the greatest extent possible. Protocols are typically developed in close consultation with major power users and updated on a regular basis by responsible parties to reflect changes in power consumption patterns and use. They are implemented in a co‑ordinated manner, in close consultation with major users, according to predetermined criteria that establish the system preconditions for deploying rotating load shedding and the potential duration of its deployment during sustained events.

For example, New Zealand has established rolling outage plans that are fully integrated with the overarching emergency management plan for responding to a loss of hydroelectric production resulting from sustained drought conditions. Under these arrangements, the system operator is required to issue a supply shortage declaration before it is able to activate rolling outage plans in response to sustained power system security events. Supply shortage declarations need to meet clearly specified criteria for activation and provide at least 14 days’ notice to major affected users before activation. In addition, declarations may include specified electricity consumption savings targets for large users.15

Mandatory consumption rationing is also often delivered through various administrative or regulatory mechanisms. They typically take the form of a consumption-saving target or quota that is specified by consumer class, quantity consumed or location. Such instruments can be more effectively calibrated to reflect economic and community priorities compared with load-shedding mechanisms. However, these kinds of administrative mechanisms can still deliver poor outcomes with significant economic and social costs, especially where the mandated savings targets unduly disadvantage poor or vulnerable consumers with limited capacity to respond. In practice, these kinds of equity issues are usually addressed through some form of carefully targeted compensation mechanism operating in tandem with the rationing mechanism.

Opportunities to review and update mandatory consumption rationing mechanisms and load-shedding protocols could be considered, with a view to improving their scope for deployment and effectiveness in response to sustained power system security events.

Behavioural change

A range of demand-side measures have been deployed during emergency events to encourage behavioural change that has delivered substantial reductions in power consumption for short periods. Measures to encourage power savings during emergency events typically rely on voluntary measures, innovative contracting or scarcity pricing.

International experience shows that calls for voluntary energy savings can substantially reduce demand for short periods during emergency events, creating greater system flexibility and resilience in the wake of a power system disruption. To date, most efforts to harness voluntary power savings during shortages or emergency events have focused on information and media campaigns to inform consumers and encourage them to adopt behaviours to reduce power consumption.

A wide range of demand-side savings measures have been successfully promoted through information campaigns during emergency events. The table below identifies several.

These measures cover electricity-consuming sectors that represented nearly all of Kyrgyzstan’s power consumption in 2019, with a focus on residential and industrial consumption, which together represented nearly 90% of total final electricity consumption in that year. This suggests that information campaigns highlighting an appropriate combination of these voluntary saving measures have the potential to be effective in Kyrgyzstan. 

However, realising this potential during a crisis can prove challenging in practice. International experience suggests some key steps for developing and implementing successful voluntary savings campaigns including:

• Identifying key consumer sectors, their power saving potential and priorities for voluntary saving during a sustained power system security event.
• Understanding the factors that influence consumption decisions and how best to motivate behavioural changes to save power within each targeted consumer sector.
• Based on this understanding, developing and implementing an integrated information and communications strategy that:

1. Clearly communicates relevant facts and what consumers in each target sector can (or must) do to help.

2. Is based on simple, clear messaging that resonates with the target audience.

3. Appropriately combines mass media, print media and social media to maximise influence and coverage.

International experience suggests that the most effective programmes to harness voluntary electricity savings during an emergency are prepared in advance and ready to be rolled out quickly when required.

Incentives for voluntary demand-side savings could be strengthened through various forms of innovative contracting. For example, a range of incentive-based contractual arrangements have been deployed internationally to help harness electricity savings during periods when power systems are under stress or experiencing emergency conditions. Several are identified in the section below.

Technologies to monitor and verify demand response in real time, such as smart metering and controllable devices, are generally deployed to enforce these contractual arrangements. The contracting party, usually a retailer, system operator, aggregator or other load-serving entity, makes the decision to activate these demand-side measures. Payments to customers are usually agreed in advance of any event that may trigger activation. Consideration could be given to developing innovative contractual arrangements such as these to help turn voluntary demand-side savings into a potential emergency management resource that could be procured by the system operator, or other responsible parties, to complement and reinforce traditional supply-side resources.

Alternatively, raising power prices to scarcity levels could provide a clear and effective incentive to reduce power consumption during periods when power systems are under stress or experiencing emergency conditions. The effectiveness of price signals in moderating demand during an emergency event depends very much on whether consumers are exposed to the price rise in real time and whether they have the capacity to respond.

If consumers are not aware that scarcity pricing is in effect, they will have no incentive to respond and their consumption is unlikely to change. In this situation, dramatic power cost increases can create unintended financial hardship. Similarly, when consumption is highly price-inelastic,16 exposure to scarcity pricing may simply result in a wealth transfer from consumers to producers without achieving the desired reduction in consumption. Care needs to be taken to ensure that any scarcity price mechanism is deployed appropriately and sends an effective signal to reduce, delay or defer consumption. It is unlikely that wide application of scarcity pricing beyond some large users would represent a practical or feasible option for Kyrgyzstan in the near term given current regulated tariff arrangements.

Energy efficiency and electricity substitution

Many energy efficiency and electricity substitution measures that could substantially reduce power consumption require significant capital investment and take time to implement. Hence, they are unlikely to offer a practical option to reduce power consumption over the relatively short duration of a typical power supply shortage resulting from a sustained period of water scarcity. Such measures are usually best pursued as part of an ongoing strategy to efficiently moderate and reduce power consumption over the longer term.

However, international experience suggests that there are some energy efficiency and substitution measures that have the potential to deliver significant power savings in the short term.

In particular, the rapid deployment of energy-efficient lighting technologies, such as compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) and light-emitting diodes (LEDs), may provide a practical and cost-effective option for significantly reducing residential power consumption in the lead-up to, and during, a sustained power system security event. A World Bank study of the impact of deploying energy-efficient light bulbs on household electricity consumption in Kyrgyzstan found that switching four incandescent light bulbs to CFLs could save households up to 60 kWh per month, or around 10% of average monthly household consumption in 2016. Furthermore, given that lighting is commonly used during the daily peak consumption period, the majority of these savings are likely to accrue when the power system is under greatest stress. As a result, these savings also have the potential to significantly improve the operational reliability and resilience of the distribution system, which can serve to strengthen overall power system security.17

Given that the residential sector uses over 70% of the power consumed in Kyrgyzstan, there may be considerable potential for a timely energy-efficient lighting replacement programme to substantially contribute to reducing demand during a sustained power system security event, especially over the winter period.

Opportunities may also exist to harness power savings in the short term through demand-side measures targeting space heating, especially in the residential sector. Space heating is a major driver of total final power consumption during the winter season, which suggests that savings from more efficient heating, or substitution of electric heating with other forms of space heating, could make a valuable contribution to improving power system security during a sustained winter season hydrological event.

For example, recent World Bank analysis concluded that residential building insulation in Kyrgyzstan is generally poor with considerable scope for improvement.18 Improving building insulation and weatherisation has the potential to greatly improve space heating efficiency and reduce electricity consumption during the peak winter heating season. A practical initial measure could focus on education and awareness-raising. This measure could include local weatherisation initiatives offering in-home advice to improve management of power consumption, potentially including providing some low-cost items such as door and window sealers to demonstrate cost-effective and readily available opportunities to improve space heating efficiency. Such initiatives may also build greater willingness to participate in voluntary demand-side programmes to reduce power consumption during future sustained emergency events. More expansive building retrofit and space heating appliance replacement programmes could be deployed to incrementally improve building and space heating energy efficiency in the longer term.

Another possibility may include encouraging switching to alternative forms of space heating. For instance, district heating may represent a practical alternative in urban areas, especially for medium-density residential, commercial or public buildings with a dormant or readily accessible network connection. Similarly, high-efficient, low-emission heating options may provide a feasible substitute for electric space heating in some circumstances.19 However, it is likely that both options would require significant capital expenditure and take some time to deliver. As a result, neither of these options is likely to deliver appreciable power savings over the relatively short duration of a winter water shortage event. A longer time frame would be required to deliver substantial savings.

Other possibilities to help manage and reduce power consumption that could be deployed in the lead-up to, and during, a sustained emergency event may include deploying more energy-efficient appliances, installation of direct load control devices for significant power-consuming appliances and equipment, and retrofitting and servicing electric motors to improve their operational efficiency. Although the potential for cost-effective, large-scale deployment of these options during a sustained power system security event may be limited in practice, these options may offer considerable potential for ongoing power savings and improving the operational flexibility and resilience of the power system over the longer term.